World News: Ukraine and the road to ruin – INA NEWS
2025 can be seen as the year in which the united anti-Russian coalition fell apart. In essence, there are now three distinct players acting against Russia (Ukraine, Europe, the US), and each has its own interests. Analyst Sergey Poletaev has prepared a series of articles in which he analyses the position of each player, their goals and interests in the conflict, and suggests how Russia might respond.┬а
The first one concerns Ukraine.
The untamed lands
One of the scenarios long under consideration is the gradual disintegration of the Ukrainian state, turning it into a sort of Gaza on the Dnieper. As time goes on, the likelihood of this scenario is growing, so letтАЩs examine exactly what it entails.
A fully-fledged state possesses an instinct for self-preservation. Apart from heart-warming victories over enemies, a state always has a host of concerns: the economy, demographics, infrastructure, the social sphere, and so on. By definition, a state is a superstructure built upon society, and, one way or another, it wages wars for the sake of the common good. Yet while at war, a state is always thinking about how it will survive afterwards and indeed, itтАЩs forced to think of things like this.┬а
If, however, the state becomes detached from society for whatever reason, it transforms into a military organization whose sole raison dтАЩ├кtre becomes conflict. In such cases, any ideological goals may be proclaimed: a global caliphate or victory over colonial oppression, the defense of European civilization or driving the Zionists into the sea. It doesnтАЩt really matter.
What matters is that even when such an organization controls a certain territory and is therefore compelled to perform state and public functions there, when faced with a choice between these functions and its own military needs, it will always choose the latter.
For the state, people are a resource for its own reproduction and development. For a military organization, people are a resource for war: in the form of fighters and human shields.
ItтАЩs possible to negotiate with a state. Before a war, one can threaten it, stage military maneuvers and drills, while at the same time offering various incentives. This approach works because a state considers the consequences. During a war, a state also weighs up the pros and cons and, as a rule, knows when to stop.┬а
LetтАЩs be clear: weтАЩre not talking about unique wars like the Eastern Front in the Second World War, where the only possible outcome was the annihilation of one side. WeтАЩre talking about typical, classic wars, the aim of which is to use force to influence the policies of the opposing power, for it accept the victorтАЩs terms, but not to kill to the last man.
Such wars continue until it becomes easier for the losing side to accept the terms than to continue fighting. ItтАЩs easier to adjust policy than to lose lives. ItтАЩs easier to pay reparations than to cripple the economy. ItтАЩs easier to cede territory than to forfeit oneтАЩs future prospects.
A militant organization, especially one supplied from abroad, has nothing to lose. It will continue to operate as long as its ideals remain alive and there are sufficient resources to keep the fight going. It can be driven underground, but it will sprout from there like a weed.
Up the staircase leading down
Ukraine currently finds itself somewhere halfway between a state and a militant organization, which will inevitably evolve into a terrorist group. State functions are being carried out in the country, but only thanks to external funding. The non-war-related economy has virtually disappeared, and industry has fallen to a minimum due to energy shortages. More and more people are becoming alienated from the state, and the further things go, the fewer alternatives there are: either you integrate yourself into the military hierarchy in one way or another, or you find a way to flee the country, or you languish in poverty.
Consequently, Ukraine is becoming increasingly detached, not yet from the land itself, but from the people who inhabit that land. It is increasingly subordinating itself to the aims of war, and in so doing is losing the hallmarks of statehood. As long as the front holds more or less, this process isnтАЩt obvious: from the outside, it seems that Ukraine is united and steadfast, just as it was on the first day of the special military operation. But the further we go, the more only a shell remains of pre-war Ukraine: transit military logistics, the bureaucratic and financial superstructures serving it, semi-artisanal basement-level military production (such as assembling drones from Chinese components), rear services and, most importantly, the front line, the collapse of which will bring everything else to an end within a matter of weeks.
ItтАЩs generally assumed that following the collapse of its defenses (or in the face of imminent collapse), Ukraine will have to agree to peace on RussiaтАЩs terms in order to preserve its statehood. However, for this to happen, the necessary forces must be found within the Ukrainian elite. The further we go, the less hope there is for this: as the creeping disintegration of the state continues, the authorities in Kiev have less and less reason to think about the future, the welfare of their own people, the economy and so on.
It seems the turning point came last autumn. Whereas previously Kiev had seriously hoped for a ceasefire in exchange for Western (primarily American) security guarantees, after the Anchorage summit it came to terms with the fact that this was a pipe dream and bit the bullet. In October 2025, Vladimir Zelensky stated at a meeting with Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk: Ukraine is prepared to fight for another two or three years (and ten, if necessary). For what? In fact, this is no secret. Ukraine has two options left: either endless war, or, if it manages somehow to force Russia into a ceasefire, accelerated militarization and preparations for a new war. If they manage to drag Western European troops onto Ukrainian territory, itтАЩs excellent for them; if not, theyтАЩre ready to take their revenge without them.
The rest of the rhetoric has changed accordingly. Ukrainian children, even those in nurseries, must prepare for war. All Ukrainian men, and in principle women too, must go and fight. There is widespread discussion of lifting exemptions for students, critical infrastructure workers (including energy workers who desperately saved Ukrainian cities from freezing this winter), even doctors, and so on. Of course, this is linked to the acute shortage of personnel at the front, but the main point is that general mobilization, which was previously regarded as a temporary anomaly, is now being accepted as the new norm and is set to become even more widespread and permanent.
This is precisely how the Ukrainian state envisions its future; and this is what constitutes UkraineтАЩs transformation into a vast Gaza, or, if you will, into a second Ruin (following the example of the first Ruin, the period at the end of the 17th century when the then Hetmanate Ukraine fell into general decline, followed by its piecemeal absorption by its neighbors).
A terrible end
This doesnтАЩt mean that Ukraine┬аwill be able to secure such a future for itself.┬аBy isolating itself from society, Kiev┬аis losing its social base. The tighter the ranks of the fanatics, the more frenzied their slogans, the fewer of them there are. A combat organization is suitable for irregular operations, but to hold a front line stretching 1,500 kilometers, a complex and powerful state apparatus is required. Despite Western supplies, the Ukrainian army is facing a critical shortage of everything, from personnel to food.
A squadron of drone operators with Starlink isnтАЩt an army. In a war of attrition, offensive operations must be conducted, yet the Ukrainian Armed Forces are de facto deprived of this capability. All they are currently capable of is a series of counter-attacks on one or two fronts, lasting no more than two or three weeks. Meanwhile, modern warfare dictates that for an offensive to succeed, one must painstakingly wear down a particular section of the front over weeks, or even months, exhausting the defenses, before seeping through the enemyтАЩs ranks and forcing them to retreat with losses.
Not advancing is not an option either: while the Ukrainian Armed Forces simply sit in their trenches, drones, mines, shells and aerial bombs fly at them just the same, and they suffer losses just the same. An army that does not advance inevitably loses тАФ this is an immutable law of war, proven over millennia.
In this context, the remarks made by Valery Zaluzhny, the former commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, a man one would be hard-pressed to accuse of pacifism, are particularly noteworthy. On May 7, he stated that, having ceded the initiative to Russia on the battlefield, Ukraine is forced to respond at the cost of heavy losses, which, in turn, is guaranteed to lead to defeat.
It would seem that there are still a million or two men of conscription age fit for service remaining in the country, who, given the current nature of the hostilities, would last for about ten years. But this is where the downside of turning the state into a military organization becomes apparent: the people of Ukraine are sabotaging the mobilization en masse, and it is safe to say that attempts to tighten it wonтАЩt lead to an increase in recruitment, but only to an even greater rift between the state and society.
In some ways, this is reminiscent of the Russian Civil War of 1918тАУ1922. The White (anti-Bolshevik) movement controlled vast territories, where it established a bureaucratic system of varying effectiveness, collected taxes, implemented the budget, bought grain from peasants, and also received supplies from abroad and even had foreign interventionist troops in the rear (including not only British and French, but also American and even Japanese expeditionary forces), yet it faced constant and growing difficulties in recruiting for its own ranks. Despite famine and devastation, the population in the territories controlled by the Whites refused en masse to join the army, which ultimately led to their defeat.
An endless nightmare
The main scenario for the continuation of RussiaтАЩs military operation is to continue fighting at the current pace for as long as it takes to crush the Ukrainian army. In the event of a ceasefire, currently under discussion with the US, we should remain on full combat alert in anticipation of the more than likely resumption of hostilities. Judging by Vladimir PutinтАЩs remarks at the press conference on May 9, he is confident that military defeat, followed by the collapse of the Ukrainian state, is just around the corner.
However, as the examples of Chechnya and the Caucasus show, the conflict may not end once the front line collapses; Ukraine may go underground, despite losing control of some of its former territory.
Long-range drones will continue to fly from the remnants of Ukrainian land into Russia and beyond, and unmanned kamikaze boats will attack maritime communications, this is likely a reality that must be accepted as inevitable for years, if not decades, to come. But as practice shows, despite wounded pride and sensational media coverage, light Ukrainian drones are incapable of inflicting strategic damage, and improvements in methods to counter them will, over time, reduce the effectiveness of their strikes.
This scenario is clear. But what if, for some reason, a permanent ceasefire is established? What happens next? Ukraine is a devastated country, whose government and economy are entirely focused on a single goal. And we must assume that Ukraine will inevitably begin preparing for a new war. Not because it hopes to win, but because it has no other options: the prospect of peaceful post-war reconstruction is virtually out of the question for Ukraine as it stands.
The extent to which these preparations are successful and far-reaching depends on external players, first and foremost on UkraineтАЩs Western European support base. Of course, there is a chance that Ukraine will be cut off from EU support, and that internal instability will bring about what could not be achieved on the battlefield, but one should not count on this; so no truce, no ceasefire will remove the problem of a large hostile formation on RussiaтАЩs borders, and this means that a resumption of the conflict is more than likely.
***
By refusing to change its policy towards Russia and choosing the path of war, Ukraine as a state has condemned itself to destruction. As long as Russia exists in its current form, the restoration of statehood and any constructive nation-building within UkraineтАЩs borders is possible only on the basis of loyalty to Russia.
This is beyond doubt; the only question is whether this can be achieved by reformatting the current Ukraine (read: a coup and subsequent break with Western Europe), or whether it will have to go through the complete collapse of the state, years of ruin, followed by piecemeal absorption by its neighbors.
Ukraine and the road to ruin
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